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Abstract
One of the important tasks in evolving a fault-intolerant program into a fault-tolerant one is to identify
the legitimate states (its invariant) from where the original program satisﬁes its speciﬁcation. This allows
us to ensure that the fault-tolerant program recovers to these legitimate states from where it satisﬁes its
speciﬁcation. It is desired that the invariant be the weakest possible so as to provide maximal options to
the algorithm for adding fault-tolerance. Requiring the designer to specify such weak invariant increases
the burden on the designer. In this paper, we present a novel approach for automating the generation of
the weakest invariant from the program actions and speciﬁcations. Our algorithm is eﬃcient and manages
the state explosion problem with the use of BDDs. We demonstrate our approach through two case studies
and we show that generating such invariants is extremely fast. For example, for a mutual exclusion program
with a state space of size 1084 states, it took 0.9 of a second.
Keywords: Invariant Generation, Fault-Tolerance
1 Introduction
The problem in this paper is motivated by the need for revising existing program
and/or models to deal with new types of faults. Since the set of all faults that
a program may be subject to is often unknown during the initial design, existing
program and/or models need to be revised to deal with new faults. One requirement
for such revision is that the existing program requirements continue to be satisﬁed.
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An approach to gain assurance in such model revision is by incremental synthesis,
which guarantees that the synthesized program is correct-by-construction.
One approach for providing such fault-tolerance is to ensure that after the occur-
rence of faults, the revised program eventually recovers to the legitimate states of
the original program. Since the original program met its original speciﬁcation from
these legitimate states, we can ascertain that eventually a revised program reaches
states from where subsequent computation is correct. This allows us to capture
two levels of fault-tolerance: masking and nonmasking. In the former, safety re-
quirements are preserved during recovery, whereas in the latter they may not be
preserved.
One of the problems in providing recovery to legitimate states, however, is that
these legitimate states are not always easy to determine. Existing synthesis ap-
proaches (e.g., [5]) have required the designer to specify these legitimate states
explicitly. It is straightforward to observe that if these legitimate states could be
derived automatically, then it would reduce the burden put on the designer, thereby
making it easier to apply these techniques in revision of existing programs.
One method for identifying legitimate states is to use initial states as legitimate
states. While identifying these initial states is easy for the designer, this approach
is very limiting. A variation of this approach is to deﬁne the legitimate states to
be those states that are reachable from the initial states. While less limiting, this
approach fails to identify all states from where the existing program is correct,
although such states are not reached in the fault-free execution. Although the
knowledge of these states is irrelevant for fault-free execution, it is potentially useful
in adding fault-tolerance. In particular, if faults perturb the program to one of these
states, no recovery may be needed. Furthermore, recovery could be added to these
states so that subsequent computation is correct. Based on this motivation, in
this paper we focus on identifying the largest set of states from where the existing
program is correct. We use the term invariant to denote the legitimate states of the
program. (If we view a set of states as a predicate that is true only in those states
then this corresponds to the weakest state predicate.) Of course, an enumerative
approach, where we consider each state as a potential initial state, is impractical.
Our goal in this paper is to identify eﬃcient techniques for identifying the largest
set of legitimate states for a given program.
Our algorithm for computing the largest set of legitimate states takes two inputs:
the program (speciﬁed in terms of its transitions) and its speciﬁcation. The program
speciﬁcations consists of: (1) a safety speciﬁcation, which is speciﬁed in terms of
(bad) states that the program should not reach and (bad) transitions that the
program should not execute, and (2) zero or more liveness speciﬁcations of the form
F leads to T (written as F  T ), which states that if the program ever reaches a
state where F is true then in its subsequent computation it reaches a state where
T is true.
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Contributions of the paper.
• We show that our algorithms for ﬁnding the largest set of legitimate states is
sound.
• With a BDD based implementation, we show that our algorithm manages the
state explosion problem.
• We illustrate our algorithm in the context of two case studies: token ring, and
tree based mutual exclusion program [18]. The invariants computed in these
examples are identical to those in [13,5]. In particular, the set of legitimate states
computed in this paper for mutual exclusion is used in [1] for adding nonmasking
fault-tolerance. It follows that by combining our algorithm with that in [13] for
adding fault-tolerance, it would be possible to permit synthesis of fault-tolerant
programs without requiring the designer to specify the invariants explicitly.
Organization of the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: ﬁrst, we deﬁne the problem
statement in Section 2. Then, we present our algorithms in Section 3. Next, we
illustrate our algorithm in Section 4. We discuss related work in Section 5 and the
conclusion is in Section 6.
2 Programs and Speciﬁcations
A program p is a tuple 〈Sp, δp〉 where Sp is a ﬁnite set of states, and δp is a subset
of {(s0, s1) : s0, s1 ∈ Sp}. A state predicate of p(= 〈Sp, δp〉) is any subset of Sp.
Since a state predicate can be characterized by the set of all states in which its
Boolean expression is true, we use sets of states and state predicates interchangeably.
Thus, conjunction, disjunction and negation of sets are the same as the conjunction,
disjunction and negation of the respective state predicates.
A sequence of states, 〈s0, s1, ...〉 (denoted by σ), is a computation of p(= 〈Sp, δp〉)
iﬀ the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
• ∀j : 0 < j < len(σ) : (sj−1, sj)∈δp,
• if σ is ﬁnite and the last state in σ is sl then there does not exist state s such
that (sl, s)∈δp.
Notation. We call δp as the transitions of p. When it is clear from context, we use
p and δp interchangeably.
The safety speciﬁcation for program p is speciﬁed in terms of bad states, bs,
and bad transitions bt. A sequence 〈s0, s1, ...〉 (denoted by σ) satisﬁes the safety
speciﬁcation of p iﬀ the following two conditions are satisﬁed.
• ∀j : 0 ≤ j < len(σ) : sj ∈bs, and
• ∀j : 0 < j < len(σ) : (sj−1, sj) ∈bt.
The liveness speciﬁcation of program p is speciﬁed in terms of one or more leads-
to properties of the form F  T . A sequence σ = 〈s0, s1, ...〉 satisﬁes F  T iﬀ
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∀j : (F is true in sj ⇒ ∃k : j ≤ k < len(σ) : T is true in sk). We assume that
F ∩ T = {}. If not, we can replace the property by ((F − T ) T )
A program p satisﬁes the (safety and/or liveness) speciﬁcations from I iﬀ every
computation of p that starts from a state in I satisﬁes that speciﬁcation.
The goal of the weakest invariant generation algorithm in this paper is to identify
the weakest state predicate I such that every computation of p that starts in a state
in I satisﬁes its safety speciﬁcation and its liveness speciﬁcation.
3 Weakest Invariant Generator Algorithm
In this section, we present our algorithm to automatically generate the weakest
invariant using the program transitions and its speciﬁcation. The goal of our algo-
rithm is to generate the weakest possible invariant from where the program satisfy
its safety and liveness speciﬁcation. Our algorithm consists of three main parts: the
invariant generator, the safety checker, and the liveness checker. We will describe
each of the three algorithms in subsection 3.1-3.3.
3.1 Invariant Generator
The input to InvariantGenerator consists of the program transitions, SPECbs (the
states that should not be reached), SPECbt (the transitions that should not be
executed), and the liveness properties. It returns the weakest invariant from where
the program satisﬁes its speciﬁcation. First, the algorithm initializes the invariant
I to be the whole state space (Line 1). Then, the algorithm computes the weakest-
invariant by calling the function SafetyChecker (Line 4). At this point, I includes
the set of states from where the program satisﬁes the given safety speciﬁcation.
Later, the algorithm satisﬁes the liveness properties one after another by calling the
function LivenessChecker that removes states that violate the given liveness property
(Lines 5-7). Removal of states due to liveness properties may require recomputation
of I. Hence, this computation is in a loop and terminates when a ﬁxpoint is reached.
Algorithm 1 InvariantGenerator
Input: program transitions p, SPECbs (states that should not be reached), SPECbt (transitions that
should not be executed), F [], and T [] state predicates describing leads-to properties .
Output: weakest-invariant I.
// Initially I equals Sp, the program states space.
1: I = Sp
2: repeat
3: tmp = I
4: I:= SafetyChecker(I, p, SPEC bs, SPEC bt);
//check the ith liveness properties
5: for i := 0 to NoOfLivenessProperties do
6: I:= LivenessChecker(I, p, F [i], T [i]);
7: end for
8: until tmp = I
// return the weakest invariant.
9: return I;
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3.2 Safety Checker
The input of the SafetyChecker algorithm consists of the initial invariant, the pro-
gram transitions, the SPEC bs, and the SPEC bt. The output is the computed weak-
est invariant, Isf , for the given safety speciﬁcation.
First, the algorithm initializes the invariant Isf to be the initial invariant Iinp
excluding the states in SPEC bs (Line 1). Then, the algorithm starts a ﬁxpoint
computation that removes undesired states from the initial invariant. If Isf contains
a state s0 such that the program can execute the transition (s0, s1), which violates
safety, then s0 cannot be in Isf . Hence, we remove s0 from Isf (Line 4). Note that a
state is removed from Isf only if the given program violates safety from that state.
Thus , if Isf contains a state s0, p contains a transition (s0, s1), and s1 has been
removed from Isf , then s0 must also be removed from Isf (Line 5). This process
continues until a ﬁxpoint is reached. At this point, it exits the loop and returns the
desired invariants Isf .
Algorithm 2 SafetyChecker
Input: initial invariant Iinp, program transitions p, SPECbs (states that should not be reached), SPECbt
(transitions that should not be executed)
Output: weakest-invariant Isf .
// SP is the state space of p
1: Isf := Iinp − SPEC bs;
2: repeat
3: tmpI:= Isf ;
4: Isf := Isf − {s0 : (s0, s1) ∈ p ∩ SPEC bt };
5: Isf := Isf − {s0 : (s0, s1) ∈ p ∧ s0 ∈ Isf ∧ s1 /∈ Isf};
6: until tmpI = Isf
// return the set of states from where the program satisﬁes safety properties.
7: return Isf ;
3.3 Liveness Checker
The input of the LivenessChecker algorithm consists of the initial invariant, Iinp,
the program transitions, the F and T where F  T is a given state predicates
describing leads-to properties. The output is the largest set of states that is a
subset of Iinp from where the given program satisﬁes F  T .
First, the algorithm creates a program tmpP where we add a self-loop to all
the deadlock states where the program p has no outgoing transitions from s0 and
s0 /∈ T (Line 1). Thus all computations of tmpP are inﬁnite or terminate in a state
in T . Now we remove all transitions in tmpP that reach T (Line 2). If p satisﬁes
(F  T ) then it follows that tmpP cannot include any inﬁnite computation that
includes a state in F . Hence, the algorithm iteratively removes deadlock states in
tmpP (Lines 5-7). If some states in F still remain then it implies that there are
inﬁnite computations of tmpP that begin in a state in F but do not reach a state
in T . Hence, we remove such states from Iinp and iteratively compute the invariant
Iinp. fdf
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Algorithm 3 LivenessChecker
Input: initial invariant Iinp, program transitions p, F , and T state predicates describing leads-to proper-
ties.
Output: weakest-invariant Iinp.
// ASSUMPTION: F ∩ T = {}. If not, change F to (F − T ).
// let ds(p) = {s0 : ∀s1, (s0, s1) /∈ p} be the set of deadlock states.
// add self-loop to the states in ds(p).
1: tmpP := p ∪ {(s0, s0) : s0 /∈ T ∧ s0 ∈ ds(p)};
2: tmpP := {(s0, s1) : (s0, s1) ∈ tmpP ∧ s1 /∈ T };
3: repeat
4: invF := Iinp ;
5: while (invF ∩ ds(tmpP )) = {} do
6: invF := invF − ds(tmpP );
7: end while
8: if F ∩ invF = {} then
9: Iinp := Iinp − (F ∩ invF );
10: end if
11: until F ∩ invF = {}
// return the set of states from where the program satisﬁes liveness properties.
12: return Iinp;
Extension.
In some cases, the program actions are partitioned in terms of system actions
and environment actions. It is expected that the environment actions will eventually
stop (for a long enough time) so that the system actions can make progress (and
satisfy liveness property). In such cases, we can apply the above algorithm as
follows: The program actions used in SafetyChecker will consist of both the system
actions and the environment actions. The program actions used for LivenessChecker
will consist of only the system actions.
Theorem 3.1 The Algorithm InvariantGenerator is sound (i.e the generated invari-
ant is the weakest invariant that identiﬁes the set of legitimate states for the program
p).
Proof. The proof consists of two parts: (1) if state, say s0, is not included in the
output of InvariantGenerator then the program does not satisfy its speciﬁcation from
s0, and (2) if a state, say s0, is included in the output of InvariantGenerator then the
program satisﬁes its speciﬁcation from s0.
We now prove the ﬁrst part by considering all parts of the code where some
state is removed from the output.
• Line 1 of SafetyChecker : Clearly, states in SPECbs cannot be included in the
ﬁnal invariant.
• Line 4 of SafetyChecker : If (s0, s1) is a transition of the program that violates
safety then there is a computation of the program that starts from s0 and violates
the speciﬁcation.
• Line 5 of SafetyChecker : If s1 is a state already removed from the ﬁnal invariant,
i.e., there is a program computation that starts from s1 and violates the speciﬁ-
cation, and (s0, s1) is a program transition then there exists a computation that
starts from s0 and violates the speciﬁcation.
• Line 9 of LivenessChecker : Observe that in tmpP , transitions that reach T are
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removed. Now, the loop on lines 5-7 removes all deadlock states in invF . If
any state, say s0, in F is not removed then that implies that there are inﬁnite
computations of tmpP that start from s0. For instance, this happens if a cycle
is reachable from s0. By construction, this computation cannot reach T . Thus,
if a state s0 is removed on Line 9 of LivenessChecker then there is a computation
from s0 that violates the speciﬁcation.
We use proof by contradiction for the second part. Suppose s0 is included in
the output of InvariantGenerator and there is a computation, say 〈s0, s1, ...〉 that
violates the speciﬁcation from s0. We consider two cases depending upon whether
this computation violates the safety speciﬁcation or the liveness speciﬁcation.
• Safety speciﬁcation. Consider the ﬁrst state where safety violation is de-
tected, e.g., because a state, say sj , in SPECbs is reached or a transition, say
(sj−1, sj) in SPECbt is executed.
· Case 1: sj ∈ SPECbs. By Line 1 of SafetyChecker , j = 0. Also, from Line
5 of SafetyChecker , sj−1 would be removed from the ﬁnal invariant. Like-
wise, sj−2 would be removed and so on. Thus, s0 cannot be in the output of
InvariantGenerator . This is a contradiction.
· Case 2: (sj−1, sj) ∈ SPECbt. By the same argument as in Case 1, we can show
that s0 cannot be in the output of InvariantGenerator . This is a contradiction.
• Liveness speciﬁcation. If this computation does not satisfy the liveness
speciﬁcation then this implies that it has a suﬃx where F is true in some state,
say sj , but T is false in all states. Now, we deﬁne a computation σ that starts from
sj . If the computation 〈s0, s1, ...〉 is inﬁnite then σ is the suﬃx that starts from sj .
If not, i.e., it ends in a state, say sl, where p has no outgoing transitions then σ
is obtained by concatenating the suﬃx starting from sj and an inﬁnite stuttering
of state sl. By construction, σ is also a computation of tmpP (Line 2 from
LivenessChecker ). Hence, sj is removed from the output of InvariantGenerator .
Again, by an argument similar to the case of safety speciﬁcation, we can conclude
that s0 cannot be in the output of InvariantGenerator . This is a contradiction.

4 Case Studies
In Subsections 4.1-4.2, we describe and analyze case studies, namely the token ring
program [5], and the Mutual Exclusion program [18]. We chose these classical
examples from the literature of distributed computing to illustrates the feasibility
and applicability of our algorithm in generating the weakest invariant.
Since we focus on the design of distributed programs, for brevity, we specify the
state space of the program in terms of its variables. Each variable is associated with
its domain. A state of the program is obtained by assigning each of its variables a
value from the respective domain. The state space of the program is the set of all
states.
To concisely describe the transitions of the program we use guarded command
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notation: 〈guard〉 → 〈statement〉, where guard is a Boolean expression over pro-
gram variables and the statement describes how program variables are updated and
it always terminates. A guarded command of the form g → st corresponds to tran-
sitions of the form {(s0, s1)| g evaluates to true in s0 and s1 is obtained by executing
st from s0}.
Throughout this section, all case studies are run on a MacBook Pro with 2.6
Ghz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 4 GB RAM. The OBDD representation of the
Boolean formula has been done using the C++ interface to the CUDD package
developed at the University of Colorado [19].
4.1 Case Study 1: Token Ring
In this section, we illustrate our algorithm in the context of the token ring program.
First, we specify the fault-intolerant program. Then, we provide its speciﬁcation.
Finally, we identify the invariant generated by the algorithm from Section 3.
Program. The token ring program consists of n processes organized in a ring.
A token is circulated among the processes in a ﬁxed direction. When a process gets
the token it can access the critical section. Each process j, where j ∈ {0..n}, has
a variable x.j with the domain {0, 1,⊥}, where ⊥ denotes that the process is in an
illegitimate state. A process 0 has the token iﬀ x.n is equal to x.0 and a process j,
where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, has the token iﬀ x.j = x.(j − 1).
The actions of the token ring program are as follows:
1 :: x.j = x.(j − 1) −→ x.j := x.(j − 1);
2 :: x.0 = x.n −→ x.0 := x.n +2 1;
where +2 denotes modulo 2 addition.
Speciﬁcation.
The safety speciﬁcation of the token ring requires that the value of x at any
process is either 0 or 1 and that no two processes have a token simultaneously.
Thus, the safety speciﬁcations of the token ring program can be identiﬁed using
the following set of bad states (i.e. states that should not be reached by normal
program execution).
SPEC TRbs =
( ∃j, k : j = k ∧ j, k ∈ {1..n} :: ((x.(j − 1) = x.j) ∧ (x.(k − 1) = x.k)) ) ∨
( ∃j : j ∈ {1..n} :: ((x.(j − 1) = x.j) ∧ (x.0 = x.n)) ) ∨
( ∃j : j ∈ {0..n} :: (x.j = ⊥) )
The liveness speciﬁcation of the token ring requires that eventually every process
gets the token. The requirement that process 0 eventually gets the token can be
speciﬁed as:
true (x.0 = x.n).
F. Abujarad, S.S. Kulkarni / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 258 (2009) 3–1510
Application of our algorithm.
After applying our algorithm with the above inputs, the generated weakest in-
variant can be represented using the following regular expression:
〈x.0, x.1, x.2....x.n〉 ∈ (0l1(n+1−l) ∪ 1l0(n+1−l)), where 0 ≤ l ≤ n + 1.
Thus, the above invariant states that the sequence of 〈x.0, x.1, x.2....x.n〉 is a
sequence of zeros followed by ones or ones followed by zeros. The value of l + 1 in
the above sequence identiﬁes the process with the token.
We note that this is the exact same invariant used in [5] for adding fault-tolerance
to the fault where up to n processes are detectably corrupted. Furthermore, the
time for computing this invariant for diﬀerent values of n is as shown in Table 1.
As we can see, the time for generating the invariant is very small.
No. of Reachable Invariant
Process States Generation Time(Sec)
10 104 0.1
20 109 0.2
30 1014 0.3
40 1019 0.4
50 1023 0.6
100 1047 0.19
Table 1
Invariant generation time for token ring program.
4.2 Case Study 2: Mutual Exclusion
In this section, we illustrate our algorithm in the context of the Raymond’s tree-
based mutual exclusion program [18]. Mutual exclusion is one of the fundamental
problems in distributed/concurrent programs. One of the classical solutions to this
problem is the token based solution due to Raymond[18]. In this solution, the
processes form a directed rooted tree, holder tree, in which there is a unique token
held at the tree root. If a process wants to access the critical section, it must ﬁrst
acquire the token. Our goal in this case study is to automatically generate the
weakest invariant for the program in [1].
We start by specifying the fault-intolerant program. Then, we provide the pro-
gram speciﬁcation. Finally, we identify the invariant generated by our algorithm.
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Program.
In the mutual exclusion program each process, say j where j ∈ {0..n}, has a
variable h.j. If h.j = j then j has the token. Otherwise, h.j contains the process
number of one of j’s neighbors. In this program, a process can send the token to
one of its neighbors. In particular, if j and k are adjacent, then the action by which
k sends the token to j is as follows:
1 :: (h.k = k ∧ j ∈ Adj.k) ∧ (h.j = k) −→ h.k := j, h.j := j;
Where Adj.k denote one of the neighbors of k.
Speciﬁcation.
Since the goal of Raymond’s mutual exclusion algorithm is to maintain a tree
rooted at the token, it requires that the holder of any process is one of its tree
neighbors. It also requires that there should be no cycles in the holder relation.
We formally describe the safety speciﬁcations in the following predicate:
SPECMEbs = ( ∃j ∈ {0..n} :: ((h.j = j) ∨ (h.j = p.j) ∨ (h.j = ch.j)) ) ∨
( ∃j, k ∈ {0..n} : j = k :: ((h.j = k) ∧ (h.k = j) )) ∨
( ∃j, k ∈ {0..n} : j = k :: ((h.j = j) ∧ (h.k = k) ))
Where ch.j denote one of the children of j.
Application of our algorithm.
The generated weakest invariant predicate of the mutual exclusion program com-
puted by our algorithm is as follows. The invariant predicate requires that j’s holder
can either be j’s parent, j itself, or one of j’s children. It also requires that the
holder tree conforms to the parent tree and there are no cycles in the holder relation.
IME = ( ∀j ∈ {0..n} :: (h.j = P.j) ∨ (h.j = j) ∨ (∃k : (P.k = j) ∧ (h.j = k)) ) ∧
( ∀j ∈ {0..n} :: (P.j = j) ⇒ (h.j = P.j) ∨ (h.(P.j) = j) ) ∧
( ∀j ∈ {0..n} :: (P.j = j) ⇒ ¬((h.j = P.j) ∧ (h.(P.j) = j)) )
Where P.j denote the parent of j.
The amount of time required for computing this invariant for a diﬀerent number
of processes is as shown in Table 2.
5 Related Work
Several techniques have been developed to verify program correctness [6,16,9,7,10,8].
For most of those methods, the program is translated into a logical formula that
describes the program behavior and properties. Then, tools are used to verify
the correctness of the program. For many of these tools identifying the program
invariant is an essential step. Several approaches have been proposed to improve the
automatic invariant generation[15,2,17,3,4]. These methods can be widely classiﬁed
as either top-down or bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach starts with
the weakest possible invariant and uses program speciﬁcation to strengthen that
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No. of Reachable Invariant
Process States Generation Time(Sec)
10 109 0.01
20 1026 0.1
30 1044 0.2
40 1064 0.5
50 1084 0.9
100 10200 0.43
Table 2
Invariant generation time for mutual exclusion program.
invariant. The bottom-up approach performs forward propagations of the program
actions to derive the invariant. Our algorithm is a top-down approach since it starts
by initializing the invariant to be the whole state space and later removes states
that violate the predeﬁned safety and liveness speciﬁcations.
Rustan, Leino, and Barnett [15,2] presented methods for forming an eﬃcient
weakest precondition to enhance the performance of the veriﬁcation tools like
ESC/Java and ESC/Modula3. Their goal is to simplify the presentation of the
weakest pre-condition to avoid redundancy and to avoid exponential growth of the
condition size. Our deﬁnition of invariant is equivalent to their deﬁnition of the
weakest conservative preconditions in which the execution of a program statement
does not go wrong and it terminates. However, in their work they address the prob-
lem of redundancy in describing such conditions while we focus on the automatic
generation of such conditions from the program speciﬁcation.
Jeﬀords and Heitmeyer [17,11] described an algorithm to automate the genera-
tion of the invariant. Their technique is based on deriving the invariant based on
propositional formulas derived from the SCR tables. Their algorithm is intended
for detecting errors at early stages of program design. By contrast, our algorithm
is intended to discover the invariants of programs assumed to be correct for the
purpose of adding fault-tolerance to such programs.
The accurate and complete identiﬁcation of the invariant states is an essential
step that enables the designers to apply the algorithms and tools to synthesize fault-
tolerant programs from a fault-intolerant programs[12,14,5]. Our algorithm auto-
mates the generation of the invariants from program transitions and speciﬁcation,
which will have a signiﬁcant improvement on simplifying the process of automated
addition of fault-tolerance. Hence, this algorithm can be integrated with current
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synthesis tools or it can be run in preliminary step to automatically discover the
invariant.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented our algorithm for automated discovery of the weak-
est invariant of the given program. This problem was motivated by the need for
ﬁnding such an invariant during the addition of fault-tolerance. In particular, one
approach for adding fault-tolerance is to ensure that after the occurrence of faults,
the program recovers to its legitimate states and subsequently satisﬁes its speciﬁ-
cation. Our approach allows the designer to discover the required legitimate states
automatically.
Our algorithm uses the program actions and speciﬁcation to automatically gen-
erate the weakest invariant. Our algorithm consists of two main steps. The ﬁrst
step is to generate the initial invariant to be the set of the states the given program
dose not violate the safety speciﬁcation. Then, the algorithm ensures that the gen-
erated invariant satisﬁes the liveness properties by removing any state that violates
such properties. In the two case studies we used to demonstrate our algorithm, we
generated the exact same invariant used in the automation of fault-tolerance for
each of those cases. Furthermore, we note that the time needed to generate such
invariants was very small.
In [12], authors presented algorithms for adding diﬀerent levels of fault-tolerance.
These algorithms are relatively complete with respect to the invariant speciﬁed by
the designer. And, the authors argue that the invariant speciﬁed by the designer
should be the weakest possible for improving success in synthesizing fault-tolerant
programs. The result in the paper shows that this task can be fully automated.
Moreover, the time required for identifying the weakest invariant is very small.
For this reason, one future work is that we intend to combine our techniques for
generating the weakest invariant with our tools for the automated synthesis of fault-
tolerant programs.
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